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Abstract 
This report aims to measure performance of Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) as it is a state-owned enterprise operating in microfinance 
serving majority of this market. Measurement of performance is based on conceptual 
framework of “Critical triangle of microfinance”. There are 3 main aspects which are 
outreach, financial sustainability and impact. It is very complicated and requires panel 
data gathering which takes time in measuring impact and there have been a lot of 
literatures and studies on that already therefore I chose to focus on outreach and 
financial sustainability measurement and assessment. Secondary data from annual 
reports is the main information applying tools of indicators and method of interpretation 
mainly provided by UNDP and MIX Co-operations and books. As far as data is 
available I interpreted various outreach indicators in 2 aspects of depth and breadth, 
financial performance and efficiency were sub set indicators towards financial 
sustainability and financial sustainability indicators itself were examined. Results 
founded that “breadth of outreach” indicators have complimentary relationship with 
financial performance and ultimately financial sustainability. However if we look into 
more details of sub-category of loan outstanding balance by type of clients, it is found 
that Agricultural Cooperatives’ results are stagnant, farmers’ associations’ results are 
fluctuating and decreasing as well as government secured loan projects. On the other 
hand, relationship between depth of outreach and financial performance and ultimately 
financial sustainability is a trade-off relationship. This is contribution of Thailand’s 
case in the existing debate of relationship between outreach and sustainability as goals 
which are equally important in critical microfinance triangle conceptual framework. 
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In addition, there are two types of results but BAAC is doing very well in managing 
credit risk to develop sound financial performance and financial sustainability and at the 
same time expanding their outreach. However BAAC failed in depth of outreach 
implying that it is not reaching truly poor farmers and government secured loans are not 
effective tools to reach truly poor farmers but rather better off farmers as they were not 
tailored well enough to suit them.  
In conclusion, there also was evidence that a number of government secured loan 
projects were benefitting only to concentrated groups of interests. Moral Hazard in 
farmer’s associations group of clients resulted in fluctuating repayment performance but 
they are considered poorer than individual farmers and not well managed therefore are 
seen as unprofitable group of client meaning that they are obviously minority group of 
clients. BAAC has to work hard to future outreach of marginal farmers not the better off 
ones and in expansion of depth of outreach concentration and less in breadth of outreach 
aspect. It is evident that BAAC is not on the edge of paradigm shift or mission drift 
which is a positive sign for future perspective.  
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  Chapter I 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Research background: 
Recently, microfinance institutions are being driven away from subsidy and as a result, focus on 
financial sustainability and efficiency are deemed important. According to Annim (2010) there 
exists evidence of diminishing loan portfolio quality as outreach increases and this has hampered the 
financial sustainability and efficiency therefore the investigation of financial performance and 
efficiency are heightened.  
However, with an aim to increase outreach there seem to be some relationship between outreach, 
financial sustainability and efficiency. There is a challenge to many financial institutions to achieve 
these 3 pillars at the same time and also Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives of 
BAAC in Thailand as being a main state owned development bank. To meet the full promise of 
microfinance- to reduce poverty without ongoing subsidies requires translating high repayment rates 
into profits. BAAC as a development bank, it has to absorb high risks in terms of government 
policies therefore high percentage of equity is owned by ministry of finance and it implies 
supervision under ministry of finance as well. 
Thailand remains until present as a developing country with problems of credit access and poverty. 
Looking back into the history of the financial crisis in 1997, commercial banks have learnt their 
lessons from the pre-crisis structural weaknesses. After that there have been reforms to 
recapitalization of nonperforming loans. This in turn increases risk assessment and management 
activities as commercial banks became reluctant to grant new loans or even to extend outstanding 
loans [Anuchitworawong, 2007] . It makes it even more difficult in the rural small lending because 
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development bank in Thailand or BAAC is dependent on Ministry of Finance and Bank of Thailand 
as central bank in terms of financial support. Crisis in formal sector or private sector in turns put 
spillover effects the real economy as a whole. According to [Anuchitworawong, 2007], this credit 
crunch problem in the private sector had consequently put spillover adverse effect on the rural poor, 
illiquid households and small enterprises on real economy. Rural poverty reduction gained attention 
and was put in the government policy under 5
th
 National Economic and Social Development plan. 
Even though agricultural sector in Thailand contributes up to 11.4% to gross domestic product 
(GDP) but according to the latest labor force survey in 2007 total labor force is 3.9 million people 
and 49% were employed in agricultural sector. Previously Thailand was heavily involved in 
agricultural activities however it began to transit into industrialized economy since 1980. In 1980 
70% of labor force was employed in the agricultural sector. 
Apparently the main microfinance institution in Thailand as a formal type is Bank of Agricultural 
and Agricultural cooperatives (BAAC). The focus is that the intervention of government in Thailand 
is considered exceptionally high.  [Anuchitworawong, 2007] claimed that BAAC as an institution 
remained highly dependent on governmental financial support since it was established until present. 
BAAC was established in 1966 as a state owned enterprise under Ministry of Finance (MOF). It 
mainly focused to provide agricultural credit to farm households and agricultural cooperatives. 
However rural households rely heavily on state welfare and remain not sustainable until present 
according to [Siamwalla, 1993]. 
The main aim has been to expand branch network to increase outreach since 1988. According to 
[Haberberger, 2005], by 2003, more than 5 million farm households were registered as BAAC’s 
direct and indirect clients while 2.7 million of them are active borrowers. This represents about 46% 
of the total farm households in Thailand. Saving accounts totally almost 9.6 million provide 
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significant proof that there is a high demand among rural clients for loans and other financial 
services. The outreach increases rapidly which leads to a question of financial performance and 
sustainability of the institution. 
 [Haberberger, 2005] claims that “outreach is meaningful only if it remains sustainable”. This rapid 
increase in outreach by BAAC raised an issue in financial sustainability of the institution in the long 
term in which this paper is intended to provide answer to this question by measuring both outreach 
and financial sustainability and see relationship between these two main objectives of microfinance 
institution operation. Critiques will be made as additional knowledge and contribution to the 
existing debate of relationship between outreach and financial sustainability in the context of BAAC 
in Thailand. 
To alleviate problem of poverty, even though BAAC is concentrating on expanding its outreach but 
financial sustainability is also an important objective of microfinance for the institution to be able to 
support the sector in long term. Even outreach is increased up to 92% by BAAC in 2003 but loan 
sharking and informal debt is very high reported on February 13, 2009 in relation to data obtained 
from registration with the government’s refinancing scheme from December 2009 to January 2010 
as in number of debtors and amount of loans in THB divided in regions as per table below. 
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Figure 1: Number of bebtors and debt registered with government’s refinancing scheme 2010 
Apparently the concentration of number of the indebted is in northeast region with 526,925 debtors 
and total debt of approximately 54 billion of Baht. This indicator implies that even though the 
outreach of main bank in microfinance claimed the successful rate of outreach at 92% in 2003 
according to [Haberberger, 2005], there is still demand in borrowing in the rural households 
concentrated in northeast region of Thailand which indicates the agricultural sector of population 
involves enormously in informal debt that they lack ability to access formal financing. This 
evidence supports the requirement of policy in direction of increasing level of access as well as 
competition in terms of microfinance activities. 
According to 2007 Socio-economic household survey conducted by National Statistical Office of 
Thailand and central bank , it was found that about 10% of the population or 6.5 million people 
completely lacked access to lending services by any state-owned or private bank. 
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Source: National Statistical Office Thailand, 2007, socio-economic household survey 
Figure 2 Percentage of Average Amount of Debt per Households by Borrowing Purposes (2007) 
As shown in the above figure, main purpose of borrowing is concentrated on household 
consumption expenditure as 67.3%. This can be perceived as “high risk” lending as the activities 
involve in household spending are household consumption expenditure, purchase of house or land 
and education in percentage of 33.3%, 31.3% and 2.7% respectively. Pattern is clear that most of the 
loan has intention only for running day to day activities which in turn implies low level of income 
generating activities. This can be a factor why it is extremely difficult to increase outreach and 
competition of commercial banks in microfinance activities as they fear of deteriorating financial 
performance and sustainability due to a rise in high risk in their loan portfolio and interest rate 
ceiling of 28% imposed by BOT at no collateral loans in microfinance activities.  
As it is difficult to get commercial banks involved in this sector and agricultural institutions are still 
weak, BAAC’s financial performance and sustainability is crucial to be maintained while increasing 
outreach and carrying out implementation of governmental policies. 
[Anuchitworawong, 2007] indicates in TDRI Quarterly Review that government should be careful 
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with financial support because he found evidence that it happened that farmers who took on 
multiple obligations by borrowing from the village fund inevitably had their debt suspended for two 
years and they experienced a shape decline in their real income but an increase in their expenditures 
which might be due to their careless spending behavior. In this light, government should be careful 
in ways to increase outreach and competitiveness of microfinance activities such as not to give too 
much subsidy to state owned enterprise such as BAAC and other commercial banks. 
 
In conclusion, microfinance institution structure in Thailand is concentrated as BAAC being State 
owned enterprise, BAAC gained huge financial support from Bank of Thailand (BOT) and Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) and competition in microfinance activities has remained low until recently that 
BOT and MOF has issued new financial master plan to be effective from 2010 throughout 2014 
emphasizing in increasing outreach as well as competitiveness by means of involving commercial 
banks in microfinance business. Receiving huge support from public sector gave BAAC incentives 
to slack as competition has been almost absence, risk is considered high at the same time because 
main BAAC customers are low income rural households who do not possess reasonable income and 
consumption pattern is risky therefore measuring financial performance and possibility for long tern 
sustainability are deemed necessary even in times of reduced financial support from government. 
There is possibility for moral hazard in lending operations and loan portfolio management. In details, 
BAAC realizes that even though it increases outreach as first priority and moral hazard in lending 
out without proper screening therefore quality of loan portfolio can deteriorate.  
 
Government policies will be looked at as well as amount of lending schemes into BAAC sources of 
funds to analyze dependence on government support and measure level of sustainability. 
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1.2 Research Objective 
Main objective is to measure financial performance of state owned institution which is Bank of 
Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) as main microfinance player (considered 
monopoly in microfinance market) in terms of outreach and financial performance as well as long 
term financial sustainability.  
The second objective is to determine relationship between outreach and financial performance of 
BAAC 
The Third objective is to make critiques to the existing debate of the relationship whether it can be 
complimentary or trade off at times. Different measurements of existing secondary resources and 
literatures will be applied.  
1.3 Research statements:  
With government subsidy and policy to increase access of microfinance to rural households mostly 
working in agricultural sector, question is raised to what extent that financial performance can be 
maintained and long term sustainability can be achieved when access is increased to a pool of high 
risk low income households. The type of institution of BAAC being almost monopoly in 
microfinance market being state owned enterprise receiving a lot of subsidy. This drives even more 
doubts to measure financial performance in relation to outreach and ultimately long term 
sustainability. If the institution is deemed self-sustainable and in good shape of financial 
performance, implies that commercial banks can also see microfinance market to be explore as it 
can be successful and self sustainable therefore competitiveness can be achieved which will 
ultimately increase efficiency and outreach. Here regulatory institutions such as BOT and MOT may 
issue policies that may facilitate commercial banks to be involved in microfinance. This paper will 
explore different angles from cases in the past from other countries as lessons and experiences to see 
how regulating agents in Thailand can make the change happen. All this is to solve informal debt 
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problem and ultimately poverty alleviation. 
1.4 Research significance: 
Most literatures in the last 2 decades on microfinance in Thailand were conducted on impact of 
microfinance in individual and village level. However at institutional level, research in this level is 
still limited. In addition, main aim of microfinance is to increase outreach but at the same time as 
more risk is put in the portfolio it is important to maintain as well whether financial performance of 
BAAC can be maintained. Critiques will add to the knowledge in the relationship of critical triangle 
of microfinance framework as existing debate. This research aims to see the trend in the past seeing 
relationship between outreach and financial sustainability of BAAC and ultimately determine 
whether throughout the years (2004-2009) the institution has been operating in a sustainable manner 
given it is a state owned enterprise receiving lot of funding by government leading to slack in 
efficiency and moral hazard in portfolio management as outreach continues to increase and support 
is being given by public sector (BOT and MOF).  
1.5 Research Questions 
 
1) How is BAAC performing as a state owned enterprise in microfinance market by 
measuring outreach level and financial performance in various methods?  
2) What is trend and relationship between outreach and financial performance of BAAC 
from 2004-2009? How does moral hazard affect BAAC as a state-owned enterprise? 
3) Does government subsidy and government secured loan funding of BAAC being a state 
owned enterprise affect financial performance of BAAC due to slack in efficiency and 
moral hazard of clients taking these types of loans?  
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1.6 Hypothesis 
1) Outreach and financial sustainability are complimentary to each other as goals to 
microfinance institutions therefore can be developed concurrently 
2) BAAC as state-owned enterprise, even with intervention by government policies can expand 
in terms of outreach and improve financial sustainability operating in profitable manner as 
well as BAAC is not behaving with moral hazards reducing efficiency in operation and staff 
in screening, monitoring and managing quality of loan portfolio  
3) Government policies implementing through BAAC are seasonal, temporary and 
concentrated to middle range farmers and not truly benefiting the very poor or marginal 
farmers 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
Many definitions of microfinance will be explored through chapter 3 as well as methods in 
measuring outreach and financial sustainability previously reviewed in chapter 2 to categorize 
outreach and sustainability in different angles. In addition, United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) has generated microfinance indicators as well as benchmark indicators proposed by 
microfinance information exchange Incorporation (MIX) published in “The micro banking bulletin” 
which I shall expand more in the methodology section to measure outreach and financial 
performance of microfinance institutions. This is main measuring method I shall use on this research.  
 
Secondary data is obtained from annual reports of BAAC from 2004-2009 to use for further analysis 
according to outreach and financial sustainability indicator.  
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Graphical illustrations will be used to analyze and interpret if relationship exists between outreach 
and financial sustainability of different measuring indicators. 
 
1.8 Structure of report 
 
The report is organized in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is devoted to introduction of the research, research 
background, research objectives, research questions and research significance. the next chapter 
(chapter 2) will explore conceptual framework of critical microfinance triangle with three main 
pillars to measure performance of microfinance, microfinance operating structure in Thailand, 
literature reviews on possibility of moral hazards effecting quality of loan portfolio as BAAC is 
main player as development bank receiving huge financial support from governmental body, several 
methods used to measure outreach, financial performance and sustainability and long term 
prospective of the institution. Chapter 3 would elaborate on the methodology and methods of 
calculations chosen in this research. Chapter 4 would seek to analyze results from chapter 3 to see 
what contributed to success or failure in case of BAAC. Chapter 5 would conclude and recommend 
policy oriented solutions and appropriate actions and deliver policy recommendations towards 
efficient operation of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and commercial banks which can be 
implemented by governmental body so called BOT and MOF. Also further studies and limitations of 
research will conclude this report. 
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CHAPTER II 
Conceptual framework and Literature review 
 
Firstly, definitions are to be clearly defined especially key words. In “2007 mixed Asia 100” ranking 
of microfinance institutions in cooperation of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) by [Gaul, Scott, al., 2008]. Microfinance services are defined as 
follows. As opposed to financial services in general microfinance services are small scale retail 
financial services, small in relation to the average national per capita income. Specifically, the 
average balance of microfinance services is no greater than 250% of the average income per person 
(GNI per capita). The institutions that provide microfinance services are as diverse as the services 
themselves and may include wholly dedicated institutions as well as subsidiary or service 
companies of full-scale financial institutions.  
 
In the case of Thailand according to Financial Sector Master plan or FSMP II in the section of 
microfinance guidelines for commercial banks, microfinance in Thailand is defined as “lending up 
to 200,000 baht per client to spur entrepreneurship with no collateral, at an interest ceiling of 28%”. 
In Thailand, as a developing economy poverty remains to be alleviated and this is impossible to be 
achieved without access to credit.  
Gap between demand and supply of credit in the formal financial institutions has been challenging 
as mentioned in [Von Pischke, J D, 1991].  
In fact, the gap is not mainly from shortage of lone-able fund but commercial banks or formal 
institutions are reluctant to lend to the poor as lending to the poor involves high transaction cost and 
risks associated in information asymmetries and moral hazards [Stiglitz, 1981]. Microfinance exists 
for that reason and it would increase financial performance through below 3 objectives of 
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measurement as whether competition in the microfinance market exists. The three objectives are 
elaborated below in Outreach and Financial performance would be defined and easier to be 
understood after an introduction of a concept of “The Critical Microfinance Triangle”. This concept 
is taken from [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002]. 
2.1 Conceptual Framework- Critical Triangle of microfinance 
 
Figure 3 Critical Triangle of Microfinance, Source: [Zeller Meyer, 2002] 
Taken from [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] citing from [Zeller Meyer, 2002], at the top of the chain, the 
macro environments of microfinance which impose direct and indirect effects on microfinance 
performance are outlined. These environments include human and social capital possessed by the 
clients of microfinance or the poor, economic policies of the country and lastly quality of the 
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financial infrastructure that supports financial transactions.  In the middle of the triangle 
“institutional innovations” are presented in the circle. Institutional innovations are factors such as 
technology, policies, organization and management structure. These institutional innovations affect 
performance in each objective of microfinance institutions. Most importantly, the defined 3 main 
objectives of microfinance which are represented at the end of each angle of the triangle which are 
namely outreach to the poor, financial sustainability and impact. Each objective has its own ways of 
measurement. Improvements of the environment make it easier for the microfinance institutions to 
reach the three objectives. From this point I would like to look at each objective on what it is and 
how it can be measured. 
2.2 Outreach 
I would like to begin with outreach. When we first think of outreach the first thing that might come 
to mind is number of clients served. However [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] noted that outreach is 
multidimensional concept. There are 4 sub categories in outreach which are 
1) Number of clients served 
This number basically indicates numbers of clients now served that were previously denied 
access to formal financial services. Reasons could be lack of collateral required, perceived as too 
risky to serve and in turn impose high transaction costs on financial institutions because of their 
small size of their financial activities and transactions. 
2) Number of women served 
This is included in the criterion for a reason which is in usual cases women are considered 
facing greater problems than men in accessing financial services. 
3) Depth of outreach 
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How well microfinance institutions can reach the very poor.  This is very important factor in 
Thailand’s case because it is mentioned in [Anuchitworawong, 2007] that it is apparent that the 
vast majority of the poor still could not enjoy the benefits offered by the government while the 
proportion of the non-poor people who are cunning in participating in these programs increased 
over time. This means that the institutions in Thailand remain incapable of reaching the truly 
poor. 
4) Variety of financial services 
If efficient and secure savings, insurance, remittance transfer and other services are provided in 
addition to the loans that are the predominant concern of policy makers are added to the 
products offered by microfinance institutions as the poor demand, better welfare would be 
achieved. 
In addition, [Woller Schreiner, 2004] classified outreach according to benefit- cost framework into 6 
dimensions as per below. The attention should also be paid to that this is a measurement of net 
social return which will depend on the interaction between all six dimensions of outreach. No single 
dimension can be left out. 
1) Worth of Outreach: The value clients place on products and services 
2) Cost of Outreach: The sum of price costs and transaction costs to clients 
3) Scope of Outreach: The number of types of products and services offered to clients 
4) Length of Outreach: The time frame of the supply of products and services 
5) Depth of Outreach: The value that society attaches to a net gain of a given client 
6) Breadth of Outreach: The number of clients reached 
All these can be achieved in 3 ways outlined as follows 
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1) An MFI adopts a poverty targeting tool that increases administrative costs.  In this attempt some 
of the non poor clients are excluded therefore breadth of outreach decreases but depth of 
outreach increases. MFIs have to come up with products that are responsive to client needs then 
length, worth and scope of outreach will be achieved. 
2) An MFI charges a high rate of interest that covers operational, funding and imputed funding 
costs 
3) An MFI offers savings with flexible terms. Scope and worth of outreach increase as well as 
breadth and depth. People who are too poor to save can save with this offer. Length of outreach 
increases because savings are a more stable source of long term funds than donations. Relative 
to donated funds cost of outreach increases but relative to commercially borrowed funds cost of 
outreach falls. 
In sum, according to my interpretation and combinations of indicators, number of women served 
and women served as well as deposits in perception of [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] are referred to as 
Breadth of outreach in [Woller Schreiner, 2004]. Also variety of products offered in [Meyer, Richard 
L.;, 2002] is referred to as scope of outreach in [Woller Schreiner, 2004]. Lastly, the same indicator 
suggested by both authors [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] and [Woller Schreiner, 2004] is referred to as 
depth of outreach. 
2.3 Financial Sustainability  
Next the second element of the critical triangle which is financial sustainability is discussed.  
Navajas et al. (2000) claimed that the poor required financial sustainable institutions which can 
provide them long term financial assistance or length of outreach in view of [Woller Schreiner, 
2004]. Microfinance institutions are to support the poor in long run as if it only supports the poor in 
short run it will hamper the social welfare of the society in the long run. In the case that when the 
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client of the microfinance institution knows that he/she will not receive additional loan in the future 
they would have no incentive to borrowers to repay their loan. 
It is difficult for microfinance institutions to maintain both outreach and financial sustainability. 
[Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] claimed that non-financial sustainability arises due to low repayment 
rate or un-materialized of funds promised by donors or governments. 
Financial sustainability can be assessed in two ways. 
1) Operational self-sustainability 
This is when operating income in sufficient enough to cover operational costs like salaries, 
supplies, loan losses and other administrative costs. 
2) Financial self-sustainability 
This is when microfinance institutions can cover costs of funds and other forms of subsidies 
received when they are value at market prices 
Khandker et al. (1998) added one more indicator to the measurement of financial sustainability 
which is loan repayment (or default rate). This is due to low default rate implies good relationship 
between clients and microfinance institutions as well as ability to pay of target clients and thus help 
realize future lending. 
Moreover, another way to measure financial self-sufficiency of a microfinance institution is by 
calculating Subsidy Dependence Index. It is mentioned in Yaron(1992) that this is an accounting 
technique used to calculate the ratio between subsidies received by a financial institution and the 
revenue received from loans. It is basically a percentage change in the yield on loans required to 
make the subsidy zero. Meyer (2002) cited from Muraki, Webster and Yaron (1998) stated that “the 
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SDI for BAAC in Thailand in 1995 was calculated at 35.4 percent indicating that it would have had 
to increase its portfolio yield from 11.0 to 14.89 to be free of subsidies in that year”. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has come up with a guideline to measure core 
performance indicators to measure microfinance. The note is written for staff who design or monitor 
projects that fund microfinance institutions. There are 5 core areas in which outreach and 
financial sustainability are included. 5 core areas are as follows. More will be elaborated in 
chapter 3 as methodology and formulas. 
1) Outreach – how many clients being served? 
2) Client poverty level – how poor are the clients? 
3) Collection performance – how well is the MFI collecting its loans? 
4) Financial sustainability – is the MFI profitable enough to maintain and expand its services 
without continued injections of subsidized funds? 
5) Efficiency – how well does the MFI control its administrative costs? 
Wisniwski (1998) studied about savings in the context of microfinance from 6 institutions and 
BAAC was included in that study. It is stated that from an institutional perspective, mobilizing small 
and micro savings can help microfinance institutions to attain self-sustainability with 3 reasons 
below 
1) Deposits can be attractive source of funds as their financial costs are normally lower than funds 
from the interbank market 
2) Withdrawals from small amounts on deposit do not expose the financial institution to liquidity 
risks such as larger savings would do 
3) Small savings are also a more stable funding source than donor funds or rediscount lines from 
the central banks. The former are generally independent from political interests. Small 
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depositors, in general, do not intervene in day-to-day business as most governments and donors 
do if they provide funds. A similar risk of dependence might also exist with larger savers such as 
a better-off people and institutional savers. 
BAAC is mentioned and evaluated in above literature in several aspects such as loan management, 
cost management, liquidity management, management capabilities, capability of developing savings 
products and technologies. The essence will be discussed deliberately in chapter 4 in analyzing 
section.  
According to Focus series No.5 (1996), MFIs can increase financial sustainability through cost-
recovery interest rates, savings and insurance facilities, intensive collection of loans and incentives 
to repay. In addition MFIs need to tailor financial product to requirements of the poor such as 
savings facilities and small emergency loans for consumption. MFIs could charge higher interest 
rates on smaller loans, thus the incentive system that systematically works against relatively high-
cost smaller loans. 
Referring to Johnson and Rogaly (2002) in the book called “microfinance and poverty reduction, 
financial sustainability can be categorized in 3 levels 
Level 1 Subsidy dependent 
The costs of the organization are funded through grants and subsidies from government or donors 
Level 2 Operational efficiency 
The non-financial costs of operation such as salaries and administrative costs are covered out of 
program revenues (interest on loans and fees) 
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Level 3 Fully self-sufficient or profitable 
The institution is generating positive (inflation adjusted) returns on assets. The financial costs of 
operation are also covered: capital for on-lending is raised through commercial loans, deposits and 
income is enough to cover the costs of these loans. 
The last aspect of the critical triangle is impact. This is the area where a lot of studies and researches 
have been focused on. However there exist methodological difficulties and high costs involved in 
conducting robust studies. Some argued that it is waste of resources that if clients continue to use 
the services it means that they must value the benefits received more than costs of obtaining them. 
2.4 Previous literatures on relationships between outreach and sustainability 
There are also a number of literatures putting argument on relationship between outreach and 
financial sustainability. According to [Woller Schreiner, 2004], pointed the unresolved issue in the 
microfinance industry which is the nature of relationship between social return and financial return. 
There exists a common belief that there is a trade off relationship between depth of outreach and 
sustainability as greater depth of outreach implies lower institutional sustainability, and great 
institutional sustainability implies lower depth of outreach. There are more costs and greater risks 
involved in lending to poor people especially those living in rural areas. “Relative to the more well-
off, lending to the very poor entails, all else equal, higher per-unit administrative costs, lower per 
unit revenues and greater risks”. Therefore it can be concluded that common ground of microfinance 
has dichotomous relationship.  
Christen et al. (1995) cited in Meyer (2002) that outreach and financial sustainability are 
complimentary because as number of clients increases, microfinance institutions gain economies of 
scale and hence reduce costs which help them to be financial sustainable. 
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However, Hulme and Mosely (1996) argued that there is inverse relationship. The reason is because 
higher outreach means higher transaction cost in order to get information about creditworthiness of 
clients and thus make microfinance institutions financially unsustainable. 
Conning (1999); Paxton and Cuevas (2002) and Lapenu and Zeller (2002) were cited in Hermes et. 
al. (2009) that making very small loans involves high transaction costs per loan, in terms of 
screening, monitoring and administration costs therefore reaching the poor and providing credits are 
perceived very costly. Several authors mentioned above claimed that therefore argue that the unit 
transaction costs for small loans to the poor are high as compared to unit costs of larger loans. Thus, 
there may exist a trade-off relationship between financial sustainability and outreach, implying that 
the shifting focus towards increasing sustainability and efficiency reduces the scope for more 
traditional aim of many microfinance institutions which is lending to the poor. 
In microfinance bulletin issue no.2 in July 1998, relationship between outreach and responsibility is 
also elaborated as “complimentary”. It is mentioned that these two are two sides of a whole, each 
incomplete without the other. Also the authors claimed that sustainability serves outreach. Only by 
achieving a high degree of sustainability have microfinance programs gained access to the funding 
they need over time to serve significant numbers of their poverty level clients.  
Referring to Johnson and Rogaly (2002) in the book called “microfinance and poverty reduction”, 
as economies of scale are achieved costs can be reduced per transaction. However problem can also 
arise as some organizations find that their users who do well need larger loans over time. Users can 
be graduating out of the target group. Although costs per loan fall when loan sizes increase, the 
disadvantage is that better-off users are likely to be attracted to the services. It is also mentioned that 
access to donor money can lead to a lack of financial discipline on the part of the institution which 
may undermine the objective of building up such institutions to survive in the longer term. 
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Moreover, views on involvement of commercial banks and private sector are also stated in the 
microfinance bulletin issue no.2 in July 1998 as follows. Those that support to trade off 
sustainability with outreach view that the private sector as the future home of microfinance whereas 
those that support poverty objective seem vary of allowing that future to be dominated by 
commercial, for profit operators. They foresee donor and government involvement in microfinance 
for an extended period of time. 
However, the essence is that donors and governments are prone to fads and are unlikely to continue 
subsidizing microfinance indefinitely and are not generous enough to do so in a major scale.  The 
only way to ensure access by the poor to financial services is to ensure that the private sector finds it 
profitable to provide such services. Only private sector will stick with a moneymaking activity even 
if it is not in fashion. 
Cull et al. (2007) conducted a comprehensive study with extensive data set of 124 MFIs in 49 
countries and suggested that MFIs that focus on providing loans to individuals perform better in 
terms of profitability. Yet, the fraction of poor borrowers and female borrowers in the loan portfolio 
of these MFIs is lower than for MFIs that focus on lending to groups. However, Cull et al. (2007) 
found evidence for a trade-off relationship between efficiency and outreach. 
Olivares-Polanco (2005) used data for 18 MFIs in Lain America to investigate determinants of 
outreach in terms of loan sizes. The study found existence of trade-off relationship between 
sustainability and outreach. 
Makame and Murinde (2006) invested the relationship between outreach and sustainability in East 
African countries using different measures of the depth (loan size) and breath (number of 
borrowers) of outreach. In this study, the evidence of trade-off relationship between sustainability 
and outreach was found. 
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According to FSMSII, competition in microfinance sector is necessary. However McIntosh et al. 
(2005) claimed that wealthier borrowers are likely to benefit from increasing competition among 
microfinance institutions therefore welfare of poorer borrowers would be lower. In conclusion, 
outreach is hampered as competition increases and putting pressure on microfinance institutions. 
Microfinance banking bulletin (1998) by Economics institute in Colorado suggested that there are 
two camps which one emphasizes on poverty whereas the other emphasizes on sustainability as a 
goal. The Maximizing outreach study found that the most financially viable programs differed in 
their willingness to set interest rates at levels that would fully recover costs. Here we can see that 
interest rate is the key to sustainability. However in those institutions that are subsidy dependent 
they can admit lower level of interest rate and lend at the subsidized rates. Ultimately, the study 
claimed that the debate whether to choose poverty or sustainability is about whether to subsidize 
interest rates. The sustainability camp views the private sector as a future home of microfinance 
while in the poverty camp wary of allowing the future to be dominated by profit operators. They 
foresee donor and government involvement in microfinance for an extended period of time. Some 
studied which type of lending is more profitable and whether it can reach the very poor as main 
clients. 
2.5 Types of institutions in microfinance 
I would like to review types of institutions to suggest that higher competition can be achieved to 
reduce moral hazard in portfolio management and to review possibility of other types of institutions 
as well as advantages and disadvantages of institutions involving in microfinance.  According to 
Zeller and Johannsen (2006), MFIs are distinguished by two criteria: legal status and lending 
technology.   
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According to Fitchett(1999), as far as the nature of BAAC is a state-owned enterprise is concerned, 
a couple of factors may be important to potential clients as advantages. First is that clients perceive 
state owned enterprise as safer than private institutions in terms of depositors’ funds are implicitly 
guaranteed. Second is that there is lower implicit transaction costs through ease of access to 
financial services. 
Advantages of informal systems are client proximity, flexibility, social capital and reaching poorer 
clients where as advantages of formal systems are risk pooling, term transformation, provision of 
long term investment loans, financial intermediation across regions and sectors. 
1) Savings and credit cooperatives are owned and controlled by their members and function 
according to democratic rules. The member based governance structure also feature equity 
concerns for weaker members.  The comparative advantages of credit unions lie in their ability 
to service large number of depositors in both urban and rural areas reaching breadth of outreach.  
2) Village banks are semi formal, member based institutions. Members can decide on interest rates 
therefore high interest rates both on loans and saving deposits are higher compared to going 
rates in the commercial banking sector. Advantages lie in depth of outreach and impact on 
poverty reduction as well as complementary services such as education or business training. The 
main form of credit guarantee relies on social pressure. 
3) Micro-banks operate with focus on reaching financial sustainability as well as wish to serve 
small scale entrepreneurs and individuals sometimes require collateral but can be substituted. 
They offer high loan sizes therefore unlikely to reach the poor. 
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2.6 Risk Management in rural financial institutions  
According to Yaron (1997), there are three types of risks that rural financial institutions must 
confront in their operations. 
 Subsidy risk 
 As subsidy dependence threatens the longevity of an institution when such subsidies may 
be withdrawn 
 Covariant risks 
 Owing to the concentration of the lending portfolio in rural and agricultural activities that 
are seasonal in nature and subject to covariant shocks 
 Default risk 
 To overcome this risk requires careful selection and screening of clients, enforcement of 
credit discipline, monitoring of loan performance and adequate provisioning of doubtful 
debt 
Moreover, in aspect of risks in microfinance Chatterjee and Sarangi(2006) reviewed the book titled 
“The Economics of Microfinance” by Aghion and Mordoch that these types of risks above can be 
avoided by joint liability or group lending. This type of lending are practiced in credit cooperatives 
are more flexible in arranging and mobilizing local resources which demonstrates the benefits of 
peer monitoring. High repayment of group lending programs may be socially optimal and may be 
the result of excessive peer monitoring.  The authors claimed how imposing joint liability lending 
can alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. BAAC also adopted this group lending 
mechanism in late 1980s and found it successful in repayment rates became higher. 
In conclusion outreach, efficiency and financial sustainability are defined according to previous 
literatures. More importantly, the main conceptual framework of this report is also explained and 
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referred to as “Triangle of microfinance” which 3 main goals of microfinance are linked together 
and explained that it can be reached as a result of development in human capital, politics and 
financial infrastructure as well as institutional innovations can be beneficial to all the three goals.   
In addition, outreach can be looked at from differ angles from different concepts. At the end of 
chapter 2, I put effort into group and differentiate relevant concepts and ideas of mainly different 
angles of outreach as well as explanation of sustainability concepts are  gathered together in order to 
understand and be able to interpret indicators. Levels of dependency on subsidy play a very 
important role in analyzing degree of financial sustainability of the institution and categorized in 3 
levels namely subsidy dependent, operational efficiency and fully self-sufficient or profitable.  
Efficiency is also interpreted as sub indicators leading to sound financial performance and financial 
sustainability.  
After each key word are defined and indicators suggested by various literatures are examined and 
categorized, previous works of examining relationships whether it is complimentary or trade-off are 
listed as many previous works examined relationships in many geographical areas, type of lending, 
target clients. There can be 2 main camps whereas one camp which is poverty camp strongly 
suggested that they foresee private sector as a future home of microfinance.  
 
Finally, in relation to literatures on types of institutions and types of risks in microfinance are listed 
in order to understand further factors contributing to advantages and disadvantages of institutions 
involved even though in Thailand BAAC is playing a main role as a governmental arm in terms of 
policy implementation being a state owned enterprise. However, there are much more rooms for 
other institutions to be involved in the future for a possible structural institutional change. Different 
types of risks contribute to understanding of risk management that microfinance institutions are 
required to take notice and manage well in order to achieve outreach and financial sustainability 
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concurrently. Review of group joint ability lending is claimed to avoid adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. 
 
More recent literatures also expanded on studying relationships between capital structure, outreach 
and sustainability for example, in Bogan (2009) he examined links between capital structure and 
key measures of microfinance success namely outreach and sustainability using panel data and 
found notably casual evidence supporting the assertion that an increased use of grants by large 
microfinance institutions decreases operational self –sufficiency.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
 
Firstly, definitions and formulas must be clear in order to be able to measure, understand and 
interpret both outreach and financial sustainability in context of BAAC. 
3.1 Outreach and outreach indicators 
Outreach can be perceived as social returns whereas financial sustainability on the other hand, 
financial returns. However achieving higher outreach does not imply that poverty is reduced. In 
order for poverty to reduce other factors namely, macro economics environment factors such as 
prices of agricultural products domestically and exported prices, suitable weather for production and 
harvesting, education, training, development of institutions to enhance education level and quality 
of human resources in institutions. Most importantly outreach must be to the right target group of 
clients which in this context is rural poor who do not have access to funds in the formal financial 
system and wanting to borrow in small amounts. 
Outreach can be looked at in different angles as mentioned in chapter 2. However, there are outreach 
indicators according to microfinance information exchange Incorporation (MIX) in benchmark data 
of microfinance institutions around the globe. However, they did not include BAAC in the panel 
data and calculation.  
 
Outreach indicators and their definitions are as follows. I shall apply these indicators in measuring 
trend of outreach from 2004-2009 in BAAC as far as data is available.  Moreover, I shall categorize 
the findings obtained as far as data is available into different angles of outreach namely, depth of 
outreach, breadth of outreach, scope of outreach, scale of outreach  and interpret in order to identify 
whether relationships among them. 
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Even though different authors differently define angles of outreach in different ways, similar 
outreach indicators will be carefully selected, measured and graphically illustrated to see trend in 
the context of BAAC outreach performance. 
 
Outreach Indicators 
Number of Active Borrowers:   
Number of borrowers with loans outstanding, adjusted for standardized write offs 
Percent of Women Borrowers:   
Number of active women borrowers/ number of active borrowers 
Number of Loans Outstanding:   
Number of loans outstanding, adjusted for standardized write offs 
Gross Loan Portfolio:    
Gross Loan Portfolio, adjusted for standardized write offs 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower:      
                    
                          
 
This indicator is strongly supported by micro banking bulletin (1998) that there is very less 
empirical results on poverty level of clients in microfinance programs and research is relying on 
loan size as the only readily available proxy for client poverty level. This is a very important 
indicator in terms of depth of outreach 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower/ GNI per capita:   
= Average Loan Balance per borrower / GNI per capita 
Average Outstanding Balance:   
= Gross Loan Portfolio/Number of Loans Outstanding 
Average Outstanding Balance/ GNI per capita:   
= Average Outstanding Balance / GNI per capita 
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Number of Voluntary Depositors:  
= Number of depositors with voluntary deposit and time deposit accounts 
Number of Voluntary Deposit Accounts:  
= Number of voluntary deposit and time deposit accounts 
Voluntary Deposits:  
= Total Value of voluntary deposit and time deposit accounts 
Average Deposit Account Balance per depositor:  
 = Voluntary deposits/ Number of voluntary depositors 
Average Deposit Account Balance: 
 = Voluntary depositors/ Number of Voluntary deposit accounts 
 
3.2 Efficiency and efficiency indicators 
Annim (2010) defined working definition of efficiency in microfinance as “using an optimal 
combination of inputs (staff time, staff number and cost of operation) to respectively disburse and 
reach the maximum number of loans and clients. This creates a distinction between efficiency and 
financial sustainability. The author claims that efficiency is a necessary condition for financial 
sustainability. While the relationship between financial sustainability and targeting poor clients 
remain crucial to investigate however institutional efficiency has recently come into the spotlight 
according to Hermes et. al(2008) cited in Annim (2010). 
As previously mentioned that efficiency affects ultimate result of financial sustainability, efficiency 
indicators are as follows 
Efficiency indicators 
Operating expenses to Loan portfolio: 
= Operating expenses/ Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
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Personnel expenses to Loan portfolio or total income: 
= Personnel expenses/ Average Gross Loan Portfolio or total income 
Average Salary/ GNI per capita: 
= Average Personnel Expenses/ GNI per capita 
Cost per borrower: 
= Operating expenses/Average number of active borrowers 
Cost per loan: 
= Operating expenses/ Average number of loans 
 
3.3 Financial Performance and financial sustainability indicators 
Returns on Assets (ROA) 
= (Net Operating Income – Taxes)/ Average Total Assets 
Returns on Equity (ROE) 
 = (Net Operating Income – Taxes)/ Average Total Equity 
Net Profit  
 = Net financial Income – Operating and non operating expenses- Impairment of losses on 
loans 
In addition to indicators of measurement for outreach, efficiency leading to ultimate financial 
sustainability which are 2 main goals of microfinance institutions, government policies and support, 
will be taken into analytical consideration as if efficiency or sustainability reduces with moral 
hazard in clients’ repayment rate deteriorates according to perception or  lower quality of portfolio 
management which can be observed by 3 financial performance indicators according to Johnson 
and Rogaly (2002) in the book called “microfinance and poverty reduction”. 
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Repayment rate =  
              
               
 
The on-time repayment rate needs to be calculated regularly in relation to a time period which is 
normally fiscal year of operation. When monitoring the performance of a scheme it is also important 
to look at trend of repayment rates as it may fluctuate over the years if borrowers have difficulty in 
making installments at certain time such as during the dry season before harvests are due. 
Arrears rate =  
                                                                          
                               
  
This shows the proportion of total loan portfolio which is at risk of turning into default at any given 
time.  Actions need to be taken to prevent moving loans from being in arrears to being in default. 
Actions can be intensive follow-up on individuals or the withdrawals of future loans. The point at 
which a loan is defined as being in default will vary.  Another word for loans being in default is 
“non-performing loans”. 
Operational self-sustainability:  This indicator is positive when operating income in sufficient 
enough to cover operational costs like salaries, supplies, loan losses and other administrative costs. 
 =  
                 
                                                                    
 
Financial self-sustainability:  This indicator is positive when microfinance institutions can 
cover costs of funds and other forms of subsidies received when they are value at market prices 
 = 
                          
                                                                             
 
3.4 Self-sufficiency indicators 
In contribution to long term financial sustainability self sufficiency indicators enables us to 
understand and interpret how independent a microfinance institution is. 
1) Sources of fund structure  
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2) Deposits to loan ratio = 
                             
                          
 
3) Funds borrowed from government agencies as creditors for government policy oriented policies 
3.5 Scope in measurement of efficiency sustainability and outreach of MFI institution 
In addition to MIX Incorporation benchmark indicators, Annim (2010) suggested that scope 
efficiency can be measured and separated in input and output based on microfinance objectives and 
sustainability and outreach. 
 
Figure 4: Scope of efficiency measure based on microfinance objectives taken from Annim (2010) 
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Sustainability 
 
 
Figure 5: Scope of MFIs inputs / outputs based on sustainability taken from Annim (2010) 
 
Outreach 
 
 
 
 Figure 6: Scope of MFIs inputs / outputs based on outreach taken from Annim (2010) 
 
For further descriptions, scale, depth and breadth of outreach are to be justified according to Annim 
(2010) which is different to definitions by Woller and Schreiner (2004) mentioned in literature 
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review. Scale of outreach refers to the magnitude of clients simply in terms of numbers, depth of 
outreach captures the relativity or extent of poor clients simply in terms of numbers, breadth of 
outreach is defined as the economic and demographic characteristics of clients. 
 
These different angles of outreach and sustainability above would contribute to my interpretation of 
understanding inputs and outputs in each indicator and ultimate goals contribution of each indicator. 
 
According to my interpretation and combinations of indicators, number of women served and 
women served as well as deposits in perception of [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] are referred to as 
Breadth of outreach in [Woller Schreiner, 2004]. Also variety of products offered in [Meyer, Richard 
L.;, 2002] is referred to as scope of outreach in [Woller Schreiner, 2004]. Lastly, the same indicator 
suggested by both authors [Meyer, Richard L.;, 2002] and [Woller Schreiner, 2004] is referred to as 
depth of outreach. 
I shall interpret that scale of outreach above is equivalent to breadth of outreach in Woller and 
Schreiner (2004). Depth of outreach is the same for both papers and breadth of outreach in Annim 
(2010) is a sub category in breadth of outreach in Woller and Schreiner (2004). 
 
In conclusion, secondary data is obtained from previous literatures on history of BAAC, past 
performance reviews and published annual reports which can be accessed publically from fiscal 
year 2004-2009. I shall use average financial results and indicators from 1999-2003 to compare 
outreach and financial sustainability results whether it is less dependent and become more 
sustainable institution. Above formulas for indicator calculations are shown in details for better 
understanding and ease of interpretation only. I shall use readily available calculations of indicators 
presented in annual reports and put in graphical illustrations for my own analysis to see trends for 
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outreach and sustainability. Graphical illustrations of various indicators of outreach and financial 
sustainability will be run to see relationships between each microfinance institutions goal in BAAC 
as a case study for contribution to the existing debate whether relationships of these goals are 
complimentary or trade off.  Also data on government policy and secured loan as well as policy 
oriented supporting tools to reach the very poor will also be assessed to see performance of BAAC 
in accordance to moral hazard and loan effectiveness and benefits to the poor. 
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Chapter IV 
     Analysis and Findings 
 
I would like to organize chapter four in as follows. Firstly I would like to identify times in history of 
BAAC in which there are significant changes to major changes in source of fund as this is main 
contribution towards measurement of self-sustainability of BAAC as well as ownership structures 
and interventions by government policies. Government projects which are claimed to have 
significant impact on BAAC long term financial viability would also be described in amounts, 
supporting channels and timeline. Outreach, efficiency and financial sustainability indicators will be 
graphically illustrated and analyzed over time. Not all indicators will be used because limitation of 
data availability.  Finally, the ultimate aim of finding out relationship between outreach and 
financial sustainability and efficiency as a sub component of financial sustainability would be linked 
together for relationship identification and further analysis in answering the question of whether or 
not government special projects affect financial viability of BAAC. 
4.2 General background  
Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) was established in 1966 as 
government-owned agricultural development bank. It is categorized as specialized financial 
institution or SFI.  According to Bank of Thailand (BOT) regulation, since 1992 it has to be 
operated with interest rate ceiling of 19% but interest rates have yet to reach the ceiling. The main 
objective of the bank was to provide farm households with agricultural credit as well as agricultural 
cooperatives. BAAC has gone through several revolutionary steps.  For many years it tried hard to 
secure an amendment to Act 1966 to obtain permission of its lending operations to non-farm 
activities in rural areas. 
 
37 
 
Significant milestones  
Year  Descriptions of major changes 
1966  Established in 1966 under 1966 Act to lend to farm-related activities only 
1975 Agricultural credit policy was issued and BAAC started borrowing from international 
financial agencies 
1988  Expansion of branch network policy 
1993  Allowed to provide loans to non-farm activities for the first time 
1998 Financial crisis triggered in 1997 affected all commercial banks in Thailand therefore 
BAAC was authorized by central bank to diversify into non-agricultural lending as a 
serious issue at that time 
1999  Government approved amendments to 1966 Act 
2003 Active clients represent 46% of farm households in Thailand and outreach is at 46% 
of farm households 
 Deposit to loan ratio reached 100% for the first time 
2001 Debt suspension program for 3 years affecting financial viability of BAAC 
2004 BOT and MOF implemented prudential measures on basis of Basel II on BAAC 
 
Ownership structure and interventions 
According to Haberberger (2005), more than 99% of the shares are held by Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) therefore literally BAAC is operating under supervision of MOF while commercial banks 
are supervised by BOT. It is acting as the major agricultural arm of the government therefore it has 
high policy oriented status.  BAAC has to accommodate the particular interests of ministries and 
government agencies by implementing a considerable number of “special projects” in addition to its 
regular lending operations. 
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Such special projects have often had negative impact on the financial viability of the bank especially 
the latest project of 3 year debt suspensions in 2001. Borrowers who have less than 100,000 THB 
outstanding loans are permitted to suspend loan principle and interest payments for 3 years. After 
negotiations, government generally agrees to compensate BAAC for the interest payments not made.  
 
In total, 50% of eligible farmers opted for debt relief and suspended their loans for 3 years which 
accounted for 21% of BAAC’s total loan portfolio. Haberberger(2005) claimed that this debt 
suspension program is definitely an obstacle for BAAC to move towards the path of financial 
viability and it poses a potential threat to its long term sustainability. Consequently, an increase in 
the reserves by BAAC became unavoidable. 
 
Source of Funds – major restructuring 
Year   Descriptions 
1966-1974 BAAC operated almost exclusively with government funds. 60% as major 
shares came from ministry of finance (MOF) in the form of equity 
contribution and minor share of 20% came from Bank of Thailand (BOT) in 
the form of special credit facility on preferential terms 
1975-1987 Mandatory deposits from commercial banks were the major source of funds 
(accounted for 40%).Towards the end of 1987, deposits mobilization from 
general public increased significantly to one forth of total BAAC funds 
1988-2001 The liberalization of agricultural credit policy caused commercial banks to 
reduce their mandatory deposits with BAAC. As a result, Deposits from rural 
areas became most important source of funds as BAAC put enormous effort 
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on savings mobilization. 
2001-2003 BAAC suffered great losses as a result of exchange rate fluctuations 
associated with foreign loans. Therefore BAAC developed a more cautious 
stance towards borrowings from abroad. By 2003, only 4.6% of total funds 
came from borrowings accounted for 28% foreign loans and 72% from 
domestic borrowings. 
2003- Present BAAC has become more self reliant in financial terms. Dependence on 
government funds, mandatory deposits from commercial banks and loans 
from domestic and foreign sources reduced significantly. 
Government- secured lending 
As mentioned previously, BAAC is main government arm for agricultural policies implementation. 
BAAC grants a large number of special agricultural development projects and policy lending 
programs. There are around 200 programs nationwide.  Most special lending programs supported by 
government departments carry preferential interest rates.  BAAC is compensated by government in 
the form of fees and interest compensation.  Special loans are considered supply driven approach 
and accounted for 7.3% of the total net loans in 2003. 
In addition, Thai Development Research Institute (TDRI)  in 1996 following results were 
identified. 
 Loans under government-secured lending programs do not reach the poor farmers for who they 
were designed, but rather the better off and more informed farmers who know the officers of the 
Agricultural Extension Service 
 Subsidized loans are not tailored to the needs of poor farmers  
 Most government secured or subsidized loans create moral hazard or unwillingness to repay the 
loan. This results in low repayment performance. 
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Table 1: BAAC Statistical highlights fiscal year 2004- 2009 
 
Source: Annual reports of BAAC, 2004 -2009 
 
 
 
 
Particular 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
5 year 
average 
growth
Increase/(Decrease) 
FY 2009/2010(%)
Net Profit (Baht Million) 1,645 1,765 2,918 5,586 6,918 7,822 36.59 13.07
Number of provincial 
offices/branches
689 923 983 1,020 1,037 1,052 9.48 1.45
Number of field units 907 938 945 946 956 957 1.08 0.1
Number of officers 13,209 12,889 12,943 12,700 12,612 12,472 (1.14) (1.09)
Number of farmers 
registered as branch clients 
(households)
3,862,558 4,010,560 4,120,680 4,341,171 4,543,672 4,496,475 3.09 (1.04)
Loans extended to client 
farmers (Baht million)
173,095 202,429 218,354 231,758 251,480 277,767 9.92 10.45
Number of agricultural 
cooperatives
844 853 885 886 866 1,043 4.32 20.44
Membership of agricultural 
cooperatives (households)
1,511,942 1,517,199 1,559,038 1,568,208 1,525,567 1,598,068 1.11 4.75
Loans extended to 
agricultural cooperatives 
(Baht million)
28,635 36,485 42,154 48,966 58,442 54,145 13.59 (4.07)
Number of farmers' 
association
121 87 75 18 17 26 (26.47) 52.94
membership of farmers' 
associations (household)
7,234 5,842 5,634 1,209 1,142 6,664 (1.63) 483.54
Loans extended to farmers' 
association
109 177 163 71 165 98 (4.19) (46.67)
Total Loan outstanding (Baht 
million)
378,853 421,701 428,586 449,182 479,858 504,884 5.91 5.22
Farmers 298,997 345,194 369,794 397,778 418,475 449,683 8.5 7.46
Agricultural cooperatives 14,945 17,762 21,278 22,073 24,659 25,674 11.43 4.12
Farmers' association 43 40 32 26 24 40 (1.44) 66.67
Government secured loan 
projects
35,195 32,183 11,969 5,592 4,247 3,686 (36.32) (13.21)
other types of credit services 29,673 26,522 25,513 23,713 32,453 25,801 (2.76) (20.50)
Deposits (Baht million) 354,306 431,401 496,621 514,667 585,907 642,499 12.64 9.66
Number of ATMs - - 110 501 600 601 40.44 0.17
BAAC Statistical Highlights 2004-2009
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Table 2: BAAC Statistical highlights fiscal year average 1999 - 2003 
 
Source: Annual reports of BAAC, 2008 
 
From 2 tables of statistical highlights above, I shall identify and calculate where data is sufficient 
and applicable for outreach, efficiency and financial sustainability indicators respectively. 
 
 
Particular Average 1999-2003
Net Profit (Baht Million) 598
Number of provincial 
offices/branches
662
Number of field units 890
Number of officers 13,038
Number of farmers registered as 
branch clients (households)
3,622,175
Loans extended to client farmers 
(Baht million)
109,991
Number of agricultural 
cooperatives
914
Membership of agricultural 
cooperatives (households)
1,557,638
Loans extended to agricultural 
cooperatives (Baht million)
23,783
Number of farmers' association 226
membership of farmers' 
associations (household)
15,208
Loans extended to farmers' 
association
56
Total Loan outstanding (Baht 
million)
283,267
Farmers 231,036
Agricultural cooperatives 14,719
Farmers' association 120
Government secured loan 
projects
25,186
other types of credit services 12,207
Deposits (Baht million) 252,587
Number of ATMs N/A
Statistical Highlights, Fiscal year 1999-2003 Average
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4.2 Outreach indicators 
1) Number of active borrowers 
I would like to start off with number of active borrowers as it is in my point of view the most 
important and can be recognized as main indicator for outreach. Looking at different angles of 
outreach it is on its own in MIX Incorporation benchmark indicators. Not only it is listed as one 
main indicator in UNDP list and (Zeller & Meyer, 2002) but also recognized (Woller & Schreiner, 
2004) as “breadth of outreach”. 
BAAC claimed that almost higher than 90% of their registered clients are borrowing from the 
institution at least for one loan per household. One household may have many BAAC members 
therefore the unit of active borrowers in this context of BAAC shall be measured in the unit of 
household not as an individual person. There are two categories which are direct lending to farmers 
and through agricultural cooperatives. 
 
Figure 7: Number of farmers registered as branch clients (households), 2004-2009 
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Figure 8: Number of provincial branches, 2004-2009 
Analysis 
Number of registered farmers and provincial branches rose over 2004-2009. Extension of branches 
contributes to a marginal extent in rising number of farmers registered in the branches in the period 
of 2004-2009 but to a great extent in previous operational period when it first implemented in 1988. 
However in the 5 year average growth of 9.48% in branches is higher than growth of farmers 
registered as clients which are accounted for only 3.09%. There is also a slight drop in number of 
registered clients from fiscal year 2008-2009 accounted for 1.04%. 
When comparing number of branches to average of data from 1999-2003, the average number of 
branches was 662 branches. The number of branches in 1986 was 70 branches and after 10 years it 
increased to 535. We could see that at the beginning of branch extension grew rapidly but slowing 
down after fiscal year of 2003.The rise is very significant from 2004-2005 but the growing number 
of clients rose at much slower rate comparing to number of provincial branches. Number of 
households registered as clients are divided in two categories of individual farmers and agricultural 
cooperatives. Number of individual farmers grew more significantly comparing to number of 
agricultural cooperatives which remained slightly around 1,500,000-1,600,000 households. 
689
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In sum, BAAC performed exceptionally well in number of branches and moderately well number of 
clients reached as numbers remain in positive trend from 1999-2009 as far as data is available. 
However growth rate in the latter years from 2006-2009 is not so significant. 
2) Loan outstanding Balance 
Loan outstanding can be interpreted in various ways such as number of loan outstanding, value or 
amount of loan outstanding and number of loan outstanding. However, the data availability is 
available only for amount of loan outstanding not available on number of loan outstanding. This 
indicator is not mentioned in UNDP list of indicators and (Zeller & Meyer, 2002) but is listed in the 
MIX Incorporation benchmark indicators. To my interpretation it is a measurement in context of 
“breadth of outreach” and this matched with (Woller & Schreiner, 2004). This data can be 
analyzed further in average of loan size per client of different types of clients against GDP or GNI 
per capita to examine measurement of outreach in context of “depth of outreach: indicating client 
poverty level which is second indicator of outreach performance in UNDP list of indicators. This 
will be examined later in the report. 
Analysis 
Looking at percentage of loan outstanding 2004-2009 in figure__, it is apparent that percentage of 
loan outstanding to farmers increased continuously from 78% to 89% as well as loans to agricultural 
cooperatives which increased continuously from around 4% to 5% with a slight decrease from 2008-
2009.  
In contrast, government secured loan projects’ portion of percentage decreased slightly from 
2004-2005 and continued to decrease significantly from 2006-2009. In comparison to average total 
loan outstanding amount and from year 1999-2003, the amount increased significantly as for the 
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average amount of 283,267 million Baht as from 1999-2003 to 504,884 million Baht at rate of 
almost 80% (78.23%). Government secured loan projects percentage of loan outstanding average 
amount from year 1999-2003 is 8.89% which is also considered significantly higher than amount 
from 2006-2009. 
 
Figure 9: Percentage of total loan outstanding 2004-2009 
 
In addition, percentage of total loan outstanding allocated to individuals average from year 
1999-2003 is amounted to 81.56% increased to 89.07% in 2009 indicates higher loans geared 
towards individual farmers as well as joint liability lending method implemented during the late 
1990s.  Joint liability group mechanism is intended to facilitate the heavy workload of field 
officers according to Fitchett (1999). In my opinion, reducing heavy workload can increase 
efficiency and hence ultimately financial sustainability. This empirical data can imply and 
demonstrate that BAAC reacted according to poor loan recovery rates as a result of poor quality 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
other types of credit services 7.832% 6.289% 5.953% 5.279% 6.763% 5.110%
Government secured loan projects 9.290% 7.632% 2.793% 1.245% 0.885% 0.730%
Farmers' association 0.011% 0.009% 0.007% 0.006% 0.005% 0.008%
Agricultural cooperatives 3.945% 4.212% 4.965% 4.914% 5.139% 5.085%
Farmers 78.922% 81.858% 86.282% 88.556% 87.208% 89.067%
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of loan portfolio which was accounted for “cheap credit schemes” with continuation of past 
patterns of political intervention in the management of BAAC’s financial resources in order to 
further populist politics therefore undermine credit discipline of BAAC and cause erosion of its 
financial performance In my opinion, BAAC has not been facing problems of moral hazard in 
lending and managing portfolio but rather political intervention through cheap credits schemes. 
 
Figure 10: Value of total loan outstanding, 2004-2009 (million Baht) 
 
Figure 11: Percentage of total loan outstanding average from 1999-2003 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Other types of credit services 29,673 26,522 25,513 23,713 32,453 25,801
Government secured loan 
projects
35,195 32,183 11,969 5,592 4,247 3,686
Associations 43 40 32 26 24 40
Cooperatives 14,945 17,762 21,278 22,073 24,659 25,674
Individual farmers 298,997 345,194 369,794 397,778 418,475 449,683
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As mentioned above that government secured loan projects amount of loan outstanding and as a 
percentage of total loans outstanding reduced greatly from 1999 – 2009. This implies that it is truly 
secured. It can be perceived that government secured loan projects are not effective tool to support 
marginal farmers but middle ranged farmers because inconsistency of policies varying through 
political interventions of populist parties.  Examples of government secured loan projects are 
summarized as per table 3. 
Table 3: Credit Services for Government Secured Loan Projects Fiscal Year 2009 taken from 
BAAC Annual report 2009 
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There are also projects which benefited majority of farmers which are agricultural rehabilitation 
plan in year 1992-1996 and 1994-1997. Both projects benefitted in total 346,318 farmers with total 
loan disbursement of 17,298.14 million Baht with outstanding balance of only 159.78 million Baht 
in 2010. Repayment was nearly complete with only 1% of outstanding amount. 
Project which was considered very well done in consistency is loans for postponement of sales of 
produce project which was implemented in 1987-2009. It benefitted vase number of farmers which 
is 6,028,164 farmers with very high repayment rate and small total loan outstanding in 2009 
compared to accumulated total loan disbursement. 
However, it is apparent that projects that are concentrated to benefit groups of interests and 
not truly reaching marginal farmers such as Beef cow production for cassava pilot project in 
1993which only benefited 400 farmers with total loan of 35.24 million Baht. Up until March 2010 
where fiscal year 2009 ended total loan outstanding is very high, this is amounted to 22.30 million 
Baht out of accumulated loan disbursement of 35.24 million Baht. After approximately 17 years 
22.30 million Baht is loan outstanding balance or 63.28% of total balance meaning 36.72% of total 
outstanding amount was repaid in 13 years.   Also on-farm water management; only 9 farmers were 
enrolled with total loan outstanding of 2 million Baht with zero repayment amount.  Another 
example can be flowering sweet bamboo growers’ assistance project which was implemented in 
1995; total loan disbursement is amounted to 3,131.69 million Baht. Number of farmers benefited 
was not available. However the outstanding balance after approximately 15 years only 68.68% of 
loan was repaid which is accounted for 54.17 million Baht with outstanding balance of 24.70 
million Baht or 31.32% of total accumulated amount of loan disbursement. Another example can be 
adjusted loan in agricultural restructuring plans and others implemented in year 2005 total loan 
outstanding is 2,395 million Baht out of 2,647 million Baht of loan disbursement. Repayment rate is 
obviously very low. 
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3) Average Loan Balance and Loan Outstanding per household 
This indicator can be referred to as client poverty level in UNDP which I derived from formula of  
=  
                                                                           
                                    
 
In this case the data shall be calculated based on unit of household according to constraint of data 
availability. Most importantly, this indicator can also be perceived as “depth of outreach” in 
(Woller & Schreiner, 2004) and (Zeller & Meyer, 2002) measuring how well microfinance projects 
can reach poor clients. All authors refer to depth of outreach therefore it can be recognized as a very 
important indicator. 
3.1) Average Loan Extension Balance per Household 
 
Figure 12: Loan extension balance per year per household by type of lending, 2004-2009 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Farmers 44,814 50,474 52,990 53,386 55,347 61,774
Cooperatives 18,939 24,048 27,038 31,224 38,308 33,882
Associations 15,068 30,298 28,931 58,726 144,483 14,706
1,000
21,000
41,000
61,000
81,000
101,000
121,000
141,000
161,000
Loan extension balance per household Year 
2004-2009 by type of lending (Baht)
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Table 4: Loan extension balance per year per household by type of lending average 1999-2003 
 
Analysis 
Amount of loan per household in category of farmers increased continuously from 2004 – 2009 
from 44,814 Baht to 61,774 Baht, amount of loan per household in category of agricultural 
cooperatives also increased from 2004-2008 but in 2009 the amount reduced from 2008. The result 
is very significant in farmers’ association which coincides with number of farmers’ associations 
which reduced from 121 to 26 associations throughout 2004-2009. 
However, in comparison to average loan per household data from year 1999-2003 the result shows 
that the loan amount per household for farmers and agricultural cooperatives in 2009 doubled the 
amount reported as average in 1999-2003. Moreover, the drastic effect happened to category of 
farmers’ associations as the loan amount per household in this category rapidly increased from 3,682 
Baht per household to 14,706 Baht per household. This is more than three folds increase. The 
increase is even more significant in the year of 2008 as the loan extended amount per household 
reached 144,483 Baht per household per year. This is resulted to extremely high amount of loan 
extension to farmer’s association while Number of households as members of these farmers’ 
associations decreased. 
Most importantly, to be able to make use and interpret this data in order to answer the question of 
whether BAAC is operating within reach to the truly poor or not, we are required to compare this 
amount of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of the overall 
Farmers 30,366
Agricultural Cooperatives 15,269
Farmers' association 3,682
Loan extended per household by type of lending 
Average 1999-2003 (Baht)
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country in order to assess client poverty level. According to Wikipedia, GNI per capita is the value 
of a country’s final income in a year, divided by its population. GNI per capita reflects the average 
income of a country’s citizens. Knowing a country’s GNI per capita is a good first step toward 
understanding the country’s economic strengths and needs, as well as the general standard of living 
enjoyed by the average citizen. The data is not available as GNI per household from year 2004-2008 
rather GNI per capita but available as GNI per household in 2009 therefore for estimation, one 
household at least comprises of 2 income earners. The estimated GNI per household per annum 
from 2004-2008 (estimated of 2.576 income earners per household) coincides with the GNI per 
household per annum obtained in 2009. Proportion of loan extended to GNI per household. Data is 
per household per year is shown in the table below. 
Table 5: Loan extension balance per year per household as proportion of average GNI per 
household 2004-2009 by type of lending (Baht) 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Farmers 24.24% 25.24% 23.90% 21.93% 21.23% 24.63%
Cooperatives 10.25% 12.03% 12.19% 12.82% 14.69% 13.51%
Associations 8.15% 15.15% 13.05% 24.12% 55.41% 5.86%
Average GNI per per capita  per 
year
71,755 77,628 86,081 94,512 101,216 97,351
No. of income earner per 
household as a multiplier factor
2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576
Average GNI per per household  
per year
184,841 199,970 221,746 243,463 260,734 250,776
Average loan balance per household as proportion of average GNI per household year 
2004-2009 by type of lending
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Table 6: Average loan extension balance per year per household as proportion of average GNI per 
household average 1999-2003 by type of lending (Baht) 
 
Analysis 
According to UNDP interpretation of this indicator in relation to client poverty level, the proportion 
of below 20% of per GDP per capita or household or GNI per capita or household is regarded as a 
rough indication that clients are very poor. Then, looking at BAAC’s results, lending to farmers 
consistently achieved consistent result of 21%- 25%. The proportion is only slightly above standard 
by UNDP implying that BAAC is relative reaching very poor clients in the category of lending to 
farmers’ households. In comparison to average result in 1999-2003, during these years level of 
client was lower than 2004-2009 as well as below 20% meaning that BAAC reached poorer clients 
better in the past operation.  
However in the category of agricultural cooperatives, it can be interpreted that BAAC can reach the 
very poor by lending through this category as proportion is below 20% and remain in the range of 
10%-15%. The proportion fluctuated within this range. BAAC can reach poorer clients by lending 
through agricultural cooperatives. The past operations in average results between 1999-2003 was at 
10% which is same with lending through farmers that BAAC reached poorer clients better in the 
past operations.  
Farmers 19%
Agricultural Cooperatives 10%
Farmers' association 2%
Average GNI per per capita  per year  
1999-2003 61,056
No. of income earner per household as a 
multiplier factor
2.576
Average GNI per per household  per year 
1999-2003
157,281
Proportion of loan extension to GNI per household per year 
by type of lending Average 1999-2003
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Lastly, type of lending which is farmers’ association, the proportion swings enormously from 2% in 
average result from 1999-2003 as well as results from 2004-2009 which fluctuated within the range 
of 5% to 56%. It seemed that BAAC reached poorer clients better in the past operations. Results are 
under 20% except for year 2007 and 2008 with proportion of 24.12% and 55.41% respectively. 
Results imply inconsistency in loan grants to farmers’ associations and not truly reaching the poor 
farmers obviously in year 2007-2008. 
However repayment rate in lending through agricultural cooperatives and farmers’ associations are 
very low resulting in bad financial performance and threaten long term financial sustainability 
which will be further described in the latter section. 
UNDP suggested that low loan sizes do not guarantee a low clientele. Likewise, growth in average 
loan size does not necessarily mean that a MFI is suffering “mission drift”. Mission drift means MFI 
moves or is going away from poor clientele for better profitability. BAAC grows in average loan 
size for farmers and relatively agricultural cooperatives but not farmers’ associations. However the 
proportion indicates that it is moving in a small range meaning BAAC is not suffering “mission drift” 
and still is serving poor clientele but not poor enough to be below 20% according to UNDP 
benchmark. 
 3.2) Average Loan Outstanding per household 
According to UNDP explanation, average loan outstanding balance is related to client poverty 
because the better off clients tend to be uninterested in smaller loans. As MFI matures and growth 
slows, a lower percentage of its clients are first time borrowers and average loan sizes will rise even 
there has been no shift in the market it is serving. This indicator can be referred to as “depth of 
outreach”. 
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Figure 13: Loan outstanding balance per year per household by type of lending, 2004-2009 
Table 7: Loan outstanding balance per year per household as proportion of average GNI per 
household 2004-2009 by type of lending (Baht) 
 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Farmers 77,409 86,071 89,741 91,629 92,101 100,008
Cooperatives 9,885 11,707 13,648 14,075 16,164 16,066
Associations 5,944 6,847 5,680 21,505 21,016 6,002
1,000
21,000
41,000
61,000
81,000
101,000
121,000
Loan outstanding balance per household Year 2004-2009 
by type of lending (Baht)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Farmers 41.88% 43.04% 40.47% 37.64% 35.32% 39.88%
Cooperatives 5.35% 5.85% 6.15% 5.78% 6.20% 6.41%
Associations 3.22% 3.42% 2.56% 8.83% 8.06% 2.39%
Average GNI per per capita  per 
year
71,755 77,628 86,081 94,512 101,216 97,351
No. of income earner per 
household as a multiplier factor
2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576 2.576
Average GNI per per household  
per year
184,841 199,970 221,746 243,463 260,734 250,776
Average loan outstanding per household as proportion of average GNI per household year 
2004-2009 by type of lending
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Table 8: Loan outstanding balance per year per household by type of lending average 1999-2003 
 
Table 9: Average loan outstanding balance per year per household as proportion of average GNI per 
household average 1999-2003 by type of lending (Baht) 
 
Analysis 
It is very apparent that loan outstanding balance per household increased in the category of lending 
to farmers from 63,784 Baht to 100,008 per year per household from average data of 1999-2003 and 
2004-2009. This is accounted for 56.79% which is significant. However increase in 2004-2009 in 
farmers lending category is less but remain significant at 29.19%.  
While in the category of agricultural cooperatives lending amount from 2004-2009 increased more 
than doubled at rate of 62.53% as well as in comparison of loan outstanding balance in 2004 to 
average outstanding balance from 1999-2003 as loan outstanding balance of 9,450 million Baht and 
9,885 million Baht, the result did not different much. The increase is significantly meaningful for 
increase from 1999-2009 as 10 years rise in loan outstanding balance accounted for 70%. On the 
Farmers 63,784
Agricultural Cooperatives 9,450
Farmers' association 7,891
Loan outstanding per household by type of lending Average 
1999-2003 (Baht)
Farmers 41%
Agricultural Cooperatives 6%
Farmers' association 5%
Average GNI per per capita  per year  
1999-2003 61,056
No. of income earner per household as a 
multiplier factor
2.576
Average GNI per per household  per year 
1999-2003
157,281
Proportion of loan extension to GNI per household per year 
by type of lending Average 1999-2003
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contrary, the opposite result of decrease in lending in the type of farmers’ association as the amount 
outstanding in 2009 is even lower than average loan outstanding in this type from 1999-2003. Loan 
outstanding shot very high during 2007-2008 but failed considerably in 2009. This implies 
consistency in policy of BAAC. 
Moreover, in comparison of loan outstanding per year per household to GNI per capita per year per 
household the pattern is almost identical with loan extension. However the proportion indicating 
clientele poverty level is much different especially in the category lending of farmers. Proportion is 
very consistent in the farmers lending type in the range of 35 % - 43% from 1999-2009. No 
significant different between results in 1999-2003 and 2004-2009. The overall pattern is that BAAC 
achieved to reach lower-end clientele from 2005-2009 performing better than period of 1999-2003.  
However the proportion is almost double UNDP benchmark indicator of 20%. This means that 
BAAC is not truly reaching out to very marginal farmers in type of directly lending to farmers. This 
requires attention in policy making to tailor more to reach out to very marginal farmers. 
In category of lending to agricultural cooperatives and farmers’ associations, the proportion 
throughout 1999-2009 did not fluctuate much at all in agricultural cooperatives but considerably 
fluctuate in farmers’ associations. Overall result of 2004-2009 improved (except for high shot in 
2007 and 2008) compared to 5% average in period of 1999-2003. In addition the proportion of these 
two latter types of lending is much lower compared to category of lending to farmers and lower than 
UNDP benchmark indicator of 20% implying that BAAC can reach out to poorer farmers better this 
way.  
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4) Deposits 
This indicator is not presented in UNDP indicator and [Zeller Meyer, 2002] but is indicated in the 
indicator of MIX Incorporation benchmark indicators and [Woller Schreiner, 2004] . It can be 
referred to as “Breadth of outreach”.  
Deposits can be categorized in two ways according to MIX Incorporation namely, voluntary and 
compulsory. These two terms can be defined as follows. 
Voluntary deposits are demand deposits from the general public and members that are not 
maintained as a condition for accessing a current or future loan and are held with the institution. 
Compulsory deposits are client saving accounts that are maintained as a condition for a current or 
future loan that are held with the institution. 
 
Figure 14 Deposits amount 2004-2009 
As outreach increases, amount of deposits also increase. We can see increasing trend from 2004-
2009. Also referring to average deposits amount from 1999-2003, the amount was 283,267 million 
Baht. Increase to 642,499 million Baht from 283,267 million is very significant. Increasing in 
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deposits also indicates higher sustainability of the institution as there is more deposit the 
dependence on subsidies would be less.  
However, in case of BAAC, a lot of government policies pressure its level of sustainability down 
further. This results in support by ministry of finance in holding shares contributing in more control 
and equity in assets. This will be explained further in sustainability part. 
In case of BAAC, clients are not forced to have a certain amount of deposits as well as assessment 
on current and future loan is not dependent on amount of deposits but rather purpose of lending, 
strength of joint liability groups and history of credit and repayment therefore all deposits in BAAC 
are considered totally voluntary. However clients in order to take out loans or be assessed, they 
have to be registered as members of BAAC and at least put small amount of money into account. 
This is more for purpose of transparency and auditing not to assess anything at all. 
4.3 Conclusion of outreach performance of BAAC 
As far as data permits two main types of outreach were examined and analyzed for interpretation of 
trend and directions for 2004-2009 as well as in comparison to operations in period of 1999-2003. 
These two main types of outreach are “Breadth of outreach” and “depth of outreach”. 
Breath of outreach performance was very well done from 1999-2003 as well as 2004-2009 in 
terms of increase no. of households registered as active members, loan outstanding, deposits. 
However, depth of outreach performance indicated by loan extension amount, loan outstanding 
amount per household per year themselves and in comparison to GNI per household per year. Even 
though the amount increased continuously, the proportion to GNI per household per year especially 
in the category of farmers failed to meet UNDP benchmark indicator of 20%. This coincides with 
what Thai Development Research Institute (TDRI) claimed in 1996 that “loans under government-
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secured lending programs do not reach the poor farmers for who they were designed, but rather the 
better off and more informed farmers who know the officers of the Agricultural Extension Service” 
and “subsidized loans are not tailored to the needs of poor farmers”.  
Moreover, particular attention was paid in analyzing government secured loan projects as the 
amount in loan outstanding in this category failed significantly throughout 1999-2009. The result 
found that it is apparent that projects that are concentrated to benefit groups of interests and not 
truly reaching marginal farmers for example, Beef cow production for cassava pilot project, on-farm 
water management and flowering sweet bamboo growers’ assistance project. This implies that it is 
not truly secured in providing these types of government secured loans. Also evidence of another 
statement claimed by TDRI (1996) is that most government secured or subsidized loans create 
moral hazard or unwillingness to repay the loan. This results in lower repayment performance of 
BAAC and is a threat to long term sustainability. This holds true in my findings as well. 
Even though proportion in the category of agricultural cooperatives proportion reached the very 
poor as percentage is lower than 20% however the repayment rate is lower than in the category of 
farmers and profitability is also lower. Also in the category of farmers’ association, it can reach the 
very poor but repayment rate is the lowest among all types of lending. 
In addition, even though BAAC is performing very well is breadth of outreach but its performance 
in depth of outreach is proportions of loan extension to GNI per household per year are slightly 
higher than UNDP benchmark indicator of 20% indicating that poverty level of BAAC clientele is 
not very poor or BAAC is not truly reaching the marginal farmers but rather middle ranged farmers. 
Depth of outreach can be examined also in terms of proportions of loan outstanding to GNI per 
household per year are to significantly higher than UNDP benchmark indicator of 20% confirming 
that BAAC is not truly reaching the marginal farmers but rather middle ranged farmers. Another 
word to conclude overall performance of BAAC in terms of outreach is that “an evidence of 
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conflicting result is found in breadth of outreach and depth of outreach”. 
 
4.4 Financial Performance and efficiency Indicators 
 
Table 10: Summary of highlight financial ratios from 2005-2009 
 
 
1) Net profits 
 
Figure 15: Net profit of BAAC from fiscal year 1999-2009 
Fiscal year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net profit to total income (%) 5.71 7.27 12.75 15.10 16.57
Average returns on assets (ROA) (%) 0.38 0.55 0.97 1.11 1.10
Average returns on shareholders' equity (ROE)(%) 3.90 6.15 10.81 11.63 11.43
Personnel expense to total income (%) 26.48 20.86 21.16 21.92 22.26
Summary of highlight Financial Ratios 2005-2009
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Figure 16: Percentage of net profit to total income of BAAC from fiscal year 2005-2009 
 
Analysis 
Net profit is main financial performance indicator. This means that overall throughout past decade 
BAAC is performing very well and managing 3 types of risks that all MFIs have to face which are 
subsidy risks, covariant risks and default risks. The result is obvious that BAAC is enjoying steady 
net profit as well as breadth of outreach. The percentage of growth is accounted for 36.59% for the 
last 5 years which I consider highly significant and the result in 2004 almost jumped as high as 3 
folds increase from average result throughout 1999-2003. 
In addition, percentage of net profit to total income of BAAC from fiscal year 2005-2009. The result 
is significant as over 5 years the percentage of net profit to total income grew 10.86%. High jump 
was due in 2006-2007 from 7.27% to 12.75% as a result of restructuring of institution and reducing 
unnecessary expenses. 
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2) Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
 
Figure 17: Percentage of average returns on assets (ROA) of BAAC fiscal year 2005-2009 
 
Analysis  
ROE is a financial performance indicator. It indicates how much in percentage that income received 
as revenue returns on total assets invested. Ratio continues to grow from 0.38 to 1.10. Trend follows 
the same pattern as net profit. In the year 2008-2009, the ratios are even higher than 1. The ratio in 
2009 contracted slightly from 2008. 
Overall increasing trend is very well observed implying that even Breadth of outreach is increasing 
but BAAC is still managing very well in credit risk management in screening and monitoring. 
3) Returns on Equity (ROE) 
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Figure 18: Percentage of average returns on shareholders’ equity (ROE) of BAAC 2005-
2009 
Analysis 
ROE is a financial performance indicator. It indicates how much in percentage income received as 
revenue in comparison to returns on total shareholders’ equity. Ratio continues to grow from 3.90 to 
11.43%. This is the same pattern as net profit and ROA. In the year 2007-2009, the percentages are 
higher than 10 meaning the financial performance is very well done that income gives more than 
10% returns to equity of shareholders as investment. The ratio in 2009 contracted slightly from 2008. 
Overall increasing trend is very well observed implying that even Breadth of outreach is increasing 
but BAAC is still managing very well in credit risk management in screening and monitoring. 
4) Personnel Expenses to total income (%) 
Percentage of personnel expenses to total income is an efficiency indicator which can be interpreted 
as how well BAAC controls administrative costs in continuation of outreach in loan disbursement. 
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Figure 19: Percentage of personnel expense to total income of BAAC 2005-2009 
Analysis 
Percentages of personnel expenses to total income in fiscal year 2005-2009 are improving. The 
lower the percentage the better BAAC is doing in terms of controlling administrative expenses in 
continuation of outreach in loan disbursement. Percentages of personnel expenses to total income in 
fiscal year 2005-2009 are considered very consistent from 2006-2008 as improving trend even 
though a slight increase in 2009 but not so much.  The result of high percentage in 2005 can result 
from branch extension as there is a sharp increase from 2004-2005 from 689 branches to 923 
branches ( increase of 234 branches) and more staff increases cost in personnel as a consequence. 
The range is from 20.86% to 26.48% which is narrow as fluctuation is not presented. This implies 
that BAAC is doing very well in controlling administrative costs even branch extension continues 
however not so extensive as in the 1980s and from 2004-2005 and breath of outreach increases. 
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5) Collection performance and Non-performing loans (NPL) 
Table 11: Collection performance of BAAC from 2001-2009 
 
 
Figure 20: Amount of NPL and NPL as percentage of loan outstanding of BAAC from 2002-2006 
Analysis 
Collection performance improved throughout 2002-2006 as we can see that the amount 
continuouslyy reduced. However, it would be more meaningful to compare amount of overdue debts 
to loan outstanding. The percentage of NPL to amount of loan outstanding reduced throughout 
2002-2006 from 8% to 4.2%. Ratio became better around 1% per year. 
Fiscal year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Amount in arrears in total N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 52,996 53,358 48,593 50,912
NPL (more than 3 months
overdue but not higher
than 2 years)
24,074 22,400 23,973 23,922 21,787 38,839 43,820 35,540 37,961
NPL as a percentage of
loan outstanding
8.52 7.75 7.45 6.31 5.17 9.93 10.44 8.02 7.99
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Figure 21: Amount of NPL and NPL as percentage of loan outstanding of BAAC from 2006-2009 
Analysis 
In FY 2007, BAAC changed the measuring method of loans in arrears from installment base to 
account base which results in higher NPL and NPL as a percentage of loan outstanding.. Account-
based method is better for improvement of tracking and thus would lead to higher efficiency and 
performance in loan collection, categorizes loan in arrears into 4 categories according to duration 
overdue from due date of Special mention, sub-standard, doubtful and doubtful of loss. NPL 
comprises of the latter 3 categories. In following figure, the NPL is calculated base on more than 3 
months  but not higher than 2 years. The collection performance during 2007-2008 improved from 
10.4 % to 8%.  This is because innovation of tracking system of loan collection which is at the heart 
of microfinance triangle theory by [Zeller Meyer, 2002]. The collection performance during last 2 
years is almost the same. The reason for the hike in 2007 in both amount of NPL and NPL as 
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percentage to amount of loan outstanding is due to coup de ta at the end of 2006 and political 
instability resulting in worsening economic conditions. 
6) Repayment rate by type of lending 
 
Figure 22: Loan repayment performance by type of lending 2004-2009 
Analysis 
Amount of loan outstanding at the beginning of the year for 2006,2007 and 2009 are excluded from 
restructuring and amounted to 40,185 and 17,254 and 17,395 million Baht for farmers each year 
respectively and amounted to 34, 32 and 30 each year respectively. During the end of 2006, 
Thailand had coup de ta. However the overall repayment rate continue to increase throughout 2004-
2009 as well as in lending category of farmers and agricultural cooperatives but very fluctuating in 
the category of farners’ association as I expected that it was a affected by coup data at the end of 
2006 for low repayment in 2007 and improved in 2008 due to flood in vietnam therefore price of 
rise increased due to supply shortage.  In 2009 there was flood in the rice fields areas of Thailand so 
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overall repayment rate slightly reduced in category of agricultural cooperatives and significantly 
reduced in category of farmers’ associations which I expect that this is due to in the mix of clients in 
the category of farmers there is a mix of many crops and farming activities but for agricultural 
cooperatives and farmers’ associations category there is concentrated of farmers with rice products. 
4.5 Financial Sustainability Indicators 
1) Sources of fund structure  
Sources of fund structure indicates level of self-sufficiency of the institutions. 
Table 12: Sources of fund structure in percentage, 1967 - 2003 
 
Table 13: Sources of fund structure in percentage, 2004-2009 
 
Analysis 
Sources of fund structure can also be referred to as capital structure. In the first stage of 
establishment in 1966, BAAC was so much dependent on shareholder’s equity (which is held by 
Ministry of Finance) accounted for 66% and borrowings from abroad 19%. Deposits in source of 
Fiscal year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deposit 83.89 85.95 87.73 87.50 85.38 83.99
Interbank and money market N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.76 0.82
Borrowing 2.25 2.25 1.62 1.02 1.83 2.11
Other liabilities 3.44 2.65 2.02 2.22 2.74 3.46
Shareholder's equity 10.42 9.15 8.63 9.26 9.29 9.62
Percentage of shares held by
MOF in shareholders' equity
82.94 81.08 77.08 71.61 66.51 62.21
Percentage of operating fund classif ied by sources 2004-2009
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funds are accounted to only 11%. Bank of Thailand had to lend hand in during year 1980-1987 
heavily by extension of loans to BAAC taken control over from MOF until 1998 however MOF still 
holds majority of shares in shareholder’s equity around 6%-10% from 1987 until 2009. However 
deposits and borrowing increased significantly throughout 1967-2003 which it finally reached 83% 
and remained in range of 83% - 88% throughout 2004-2009. Borrowing from broad dropped since 
2001 due to realization of huge risk in loss in currency devaluation. Another Significant change is 
that MOF’s shares in shareholders’ equity started to reduce gradually after long years of BAAC 
operation from 2004-2009 from 83%-62%. Above analysis shows that BAAC has achieved very 
great result in institution restructuring towards self-sufficient microfinance institution. 
2) Deposits to loan ratio  
Deposits to loan ration is an indicator that measure self-sufficiency and the ability of the 
institution to mobilize savings 
Table 14: Deposits to loan ratio 1986 – 1996 taken from Fitchett (1999) 
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Table 15: Deposits to loan ratio 2004 – 2009 
 
 
Analysis 
Deposits to loan ratio shall confirm above analysis shows that BAAC has achieved very great result 
in institution restructuring towards self-sufficient microfinance institution. Deposit to loan ratio has 
gradually improved throughout 1967-2009 which is the nearly almost all years of operation.  During 
1987 – 2001 it improved a lot due to launching of special promissory note.  It imitated the lottery 
system. BAAC members are also influenced by media because the 1st prize award is considered 
very high compared to normal government lottery. The deposits to loan outstanding percentage 
reached 100% for the first time in 2003. During 2004-2009, deposit to loan ratio continued to 
increase.  Deposit amount increase because of launching new products such as retirement deposits, 
promissory notes.  These demanded oriented products raised up deposits from public in a high 
degree .Deposit to loan ratio is higher means that BAAC has self-sufficient. But if it too high, it will 
be deposit interest burden. BAAC is truly moving towards self-financing institution. According to 
theory of 3 levels of institution, BAAC is now in level 3 meaning that the institution is generating 
positive returns on assets. The financial costs of operation are also covered: capital for on-lending is 
raised through commercial loans, deposits and income is enough to cover the costs of these loans. 
Fiscal year
Deposits
(Million Baht)
Loan
outstanding
(Million Baht)
Deposit to
loan ratio
2004 354,306 378,853 0.94
2005 431,401 421,701 1.02
2006 496,621 428,586 1.16
2007 514,667 449,182 1.15
2008 585,907 479,858 1.22
2009 642,499 504,884 1.27
Deposit to Loan ratio 2004-2009
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4.6 Relationship between outreach and financial sustainability 
A number of indicators were calculated, examined and analyzed over time in period of 2004-2009 
and previous years in relation to availability of data to interpret trend of outreach, financial 
performance with an efficiency indicators as well as sustainability indicators in order to understand 
relationship between outreach and financial sustainability whether it is complimentary or trade-off.  
In the figure below “Breadth of outreach” (represented by No. of registered households as active 
borrowers from the 3 types of lending categories combined) increased continuously in correlation to 
financial performance and sustainability (represented by net profit). This implies that as outreach 
increases BAAC is managing all types of risks especially credit risks very well as financial 
performance is positively increasing. This is clearly a complimentary relationship in BAAC’s case. 
Net profit and breadth of outreach are representatives of financial performance in further 
contribution to financial sustainability and outreach respectively.  
 
Figure 23: Net Profit versus number of registered households as active borrowers 
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Other indicators of “breadth of outreach” that were examined in this report are as follows 
 Number of provincial branches 
 Loan extension balance 
 Loan outstanding balance by type of clients 
 Farmers 
 Agricultural Cooperatives 
 Farmers’ Associations 
 Government secured loan projects 
 Deposits (not allocated to each type of clients) 
All of above “breadth of outreach” indicators have complimentary relationship with financial 
performance and ultimately financial sustainability. However if we look into more details of sub-
category of loan outstanding balance by type of clients, it is found that Agricultural Cooperatives’ 
results are stagnant, farmers’ associations’ results are fluctuating and decreasing as well as 
government secured loan projects. 
Other indicators of “depth of outreach” that were examined in this report are as follows 
 Average loan extension balance per household in proportion to GNI per household per year 
 Average loan outstanding balance per household in proportion to GNI per household per year 
However, in terms of “depth of outreach” (represented by indicators of loan extension balance per 
household to GNI per household per year and loan outstanding balance per household to GNI per 
household per year), I found that the relationship between depth of outreach and financial 
sustainability is rather trade-off. There are important implications as follows  
 Loans under government-secured lending programs do not reach the poor farmers for who they 
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were designed, but rather the better off and more informed farmers who know the officers of the 
Agricultural Extension Service 
 Subsidized loans are not tailored to the needs of poor farmers  
 Most government secured or subsidized loans create moral hazard or unwillingness to repay the 
loan. This results in low repayment performance. 
The results in both loan extension and loan outstanding in proportion to GNI per capita suggested 
that BAAC is performing below 20% which is UNDP benchmark indicator to measure poverty of 
clients’ pool benefiting from the loan. In conclusion, relationship between depth of outreach and 
financial performance and ultimately financial sustainability is a trade-off relationship. 
Indicators of financial performance and financial sustainability, unlike outreach which are divided 
into two main angles of measurement, below indicators are examined in and results of indicators are 
slightly different but best fitted in the overall trend. 
Other indicators of “financial performance” that were examined in this report are as follows 
 Net profit 
 Net profit to total income percentage 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Returns on shareholders’ equity (ROE) 
 Collection performance and non performing loans 
 Repayment performance by type of clients 
 Personal expenses to total income percentage as an efficiency indicator towards financial 
performance 
Financial performance indicators above contribute to financial sustainability however direct 
indicators of financial sufficiency and sustainability that were examined in this report are as follows 
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 Sources of fund structure  
 Deposits to loan ratio 
In conclusion, there are two types of results but BAAC is doing very well in managing credit risk to 
develop sound financial performance and financial sustainability and at the same time expanding 
their outreach. However BAAC failed in depth of outreach implying that it is not reaching truly 
poor farmers and government secured loans are not effective tools to reach truly poor farmers but 
rather better off farmers as they were not tailored well enough to suit them.  
In addition, there also was evidence that a number of government secured loan projects were 
benefitting only to concentrated groups of interests. Moral Hazard in farmer’s associations group of 
clients resulted in fluctuating repayment performance but they are considered poorer than individual 
farmers and not well managed therefore are seen as unprofitable group of client meaning that they 
are obviously minority group of clients. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion of major findings 
Major findings are strongly related to hypothesis stated in chapter 1, therefore I shall examine these 
hypotheses whether each one holds true or not with further descriptive explanations. 
1) Outreach and financial performance in contribution to long term sustainability are 
complimentary to each other as goals to microfinance institutions therefore can be developed 
concurrently 
 
This holds true in case of breadth of outreach but on the contrary fault in terms of depth of 
outreach. However, these two goals in the triangle of microfinance can be achieved together if 
BAAC can manage well all types of risks especially credit risks. BAAC has to work on tailoring 
demand oriented products to better suit the marginal group of farmers. BAAC has to face 
obstacles in seasonal crops and farming, natural calamities and migrants into big cities as other 
factors beyond credit risks. Moreover, risks which are not able to be avoided are political 
intervention risks by populist parties. There is evidence on this is represented by the amount of 
money BAAC is owing to public institutions as creditors for purpose of government-oriented 
policy projects 2004-2010. In figure 24 we can we the trend from 2004-2007 that BAAC is less 
prone to political intervention risks as BAAC owed less and less to public institution creditors 
even though there was an election in 2006 and 2007. However there was a coup de ta and 
turmoil during those 2 years therefore political parties did not pay attention and did not have 
time to build up interests in populist ways. On the other hand, when the former prime minister 
was sent in exile and certain political party has to build up their popularity among farmers who 
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are majority of population we can see the sharp trend in rising amount BAAC owing to public 
institutions. It is obvious that from 2008 to 2009 there is a sharp rise of BAAC implementation 
of government policy oriented projects and leading towards election in 2011 the amount almost 
doubled from 2009-2010. Also other contributing factors affecting this rise can be natural 
calamities and draught in 2009. 
 
Figure 24: Amount BAAC owing to public institutions as creditors for purpose of government 
policy-oriented projects 2004-2010 (million Baht) 
 
2) BAAC as state-owned enterprise, even with intervention by government policies can expand 
in terms of outreach and improve financial sustainability operating in profitable manner as 
well as BAAC is not behaving with moral hazards reducing efficiency in operation and staff 
in screening, monitoring and managing quality of loan portfolio  
 
BAAC being a state-owned enterprise faced major restructuring in terms of source of funds towards 
financial sustainability with profitable result financial performance. There are many public 
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government institutions that support BAAC in terms of fund extension however BAAC manages to 
pay back in a sound manner when clients pay back the loan.  Attempt in trying to extend more loans 
to marginal group of farmers and support in times of natural crisis and seasonal risks involved in 
agricultural lending showed that BAAC is not pursuing “Paradigm shift” or “mission drift” 
towards sound financial performance only which is global issue for microfinance institutions around 
the world. However, needless to say that BAAC is focusing on economic viability and sustainability 
as well as outreach of financial services concurrently and it has been doing a great job. Moreover, 
BAAC has managed to resist the pressure exerted by political interest groups as well as interference 
from local government in regards to borrower selection and lending decisions. BAAC was mostly 
affected by the government direct debt suspension programs initiated by populist governments a 
number of times however with guarantee by government BAAC has managed to remain profitable. 
In addition, data is limited on calculation of efficiency indicators however the one that was 
interpreted as personnel expenses in proportion to total income percentage. BAAC is also managing 
very well in this aspect as number of branches continues to increase but BAAC can maintain 
personnel expenses percentage in consistency and at appropriate level. 
 
3) Government policies implementing through BAAC are seasonal, temporary and 
concentrated to middle range farmers and not truly benefiting marginal farmers. 
Depth of outreach which measures and indicates poverty of BAAC clientele indicated that loans 
under government-secured lending programs do not reach the poor farmers for who they were 
designed, but rather the better off and more informed farmers who know the officers of the 
Agricultural Extension Service, subsidized loans are not tailored to the needs of poor farmers and 
most government secured or subsidized loans create moral hazard or unwillingness to repay the loan. 
This hypothesis holds true.  
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5.2 Conclusion 
This report aims to measure performance of Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) as it is a state-owned enterprise operating in microfinance serving majority of this market. 
Measurement of performance is based on conceptual framework of “Critical triangle of 
microfinance” by [Zeller Meyer, 2002]. There are 3 main aspects which are outreach, financial 
sustainability and impact. It is very complicated and requires panel data gathering which takes time 
in measuring impact and there have been a lot of literatures and studies on that already therefore I 
chose to focus on outreach and financial sustainability measurement and assessment. Secondary 
data from annual reports is the main information applying tools of indicators and method of 
interpretation mainly provided by UNDP and MIX Co-operations and books. As far as data is 
available I interpreted various outreach indicators in 2 aspects of depth and breadth, financial 
performance and efficiency were sub set indicators towards financial sustainability and financial 
sustainability indicators itself were examined. Results founded that “breadth of outreach” indicators 
have complimentary relationship with financial performance and ultimately financial 
sustainability. However if we look into more details of sub-category of loan outstanding balance by 
type of clients, it is found that Agricultural Cooperatives’ results are stagnant, farmers’ associations’ 
results are fluctuating and decreasing as well as government secured loan projects. On the other 
hand, relationship between depth of outreach and financial performance and ultimately financial 
sustainability is a trade-off relationship. This is contribution of Thailand’s case in the existing 
debate of relationship between outreach and sustainability as goals which are equally important in 
critical microfinance triangle conceptual framework. 
In conclusion, there are two types of results but BAAC is doing very well in managing credit risk to 
develop sound financial performance and financial sustainability and at the same time expanding the 
outreach. However BAAC failed in depth of outreach implying that it is not reaching truly poor 
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farmers and government secured loans are not effective tools to reach truly poor farmers but rather 
better off farmers as they were not tailored well enough to suit them.  
In addition, there also was evidence that a number of government secured loan projects were 
benefitting only to concentrated groups of interests. Moral Hazard in farmer’s associations group of 
clients resulted in fluctuating repayment performance but they are considered poorer than individual 
farmers and not well managed therefore are seen as unprofitable group of client meaning that they 
are obviously minority group of clients. BAAC has to work hard to future outreach of marginal 
farmers not the better off ones and in expansion of depth of outreach concentration and less in 
breadth of outreach aspect. It is evident that BAAC is not on the edge of paradigm shift or mission 
drift which is a positive sign.  
For future development of BAAC, depth of outreach can be expanded to be more demand oriented 
products which should be better designed and tailored towards the marginal group of farmers or 
clients. For example, insurance products, more practice on joint liability groups lending and cash 
flow-based lending which is a new credit delivery system for small borrowers which BAAC has 
already implemented recently but know how on making it effective is on process of gaining 
expertise and experience. 
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